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ABSTRACT & SUMMARY
Each democratic nation with the Montesquieu Trias Politica separation of powers
of the Executive, Legislative and Judiciary branches of government is advised to
create an Economic Supreme Court as a fourth branch. The new UK Office for
Budget Responsibility (OBR) falls short of that and will fail in scientific advice
just like the US Council of Economic Advisors, the German Sachverständigenrat,
the French Commissariat Général du Plan and the Dutch Centraal Planbureau.
The OBR’s setup is likely to put the UK on a path of self-fulfilling forecasts of
lower sustainable growth and higher unemployment than necessary. This paper is
a small update of my 2005 book “Definition & Reality in the General Theory of
Political Economy” (DRGTPE) with respect to the economic crisis since 2007.
This paper also discusses aspects of the continued stagflation, the euro,
investments and the environment.
I. INTRODUCTION
To my knowledge the best explanation of the Credit Crunch is given by Hellwig (2008a) with a
lucid review in (2008b). Independently Levitin & Wachter (2010) arrive at essentially the same
analysis and provide clarification why other analyses are unsatisfactory. The financial system still
isn’t repaired though, subsequently we have problems with national budgets and the euro, the EU-
27 now have 23 million unemployed (9.6%), the US have 15 million unemployed (9.8%), and
Kuttner (2010) reports on the risk of a next banking crisis due to legalities on foreclosures.
Colignatus (2005, 2009b) (DRGTPE) gives an umbrella for such crises. This present paper allows
a short update of this analysis on the 2007+ events. The cause of this update is the creation of the
UK Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR).
Chancellor George Osborne (2010)’s memo that created the OBR involves a major institutional
reform in a major country with an impressive contribution to economic theory. Like the USA
with the Council of Economic Advisors, Germany with the Sachverständigenrat, France with the
Commissariat Général du Plan, and the Netherlands with the Centraal Planbureau the UK now
has its own externalized economic advisory and forecasting body (though apparently somewhat
limited in its advisory role). At the time of this writing the OBR is in the stage of legislation. 
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2However, none of the advising bodies warned about the Credit Crunch. And when it happened in
2007 they did not adequately warn about the consequences that we face now. The cause is that
none of these existing advisors is sufficiently scientific. None is as independent as science
requires. My advice since Colignatus (1994) (in Dutch) is that each democratic nation creates an
Economic Supreme Court (ESC) as a fourth branch to Montesquieu’s Trias Politica of the
Executive, Legislative and Judiciary branches of government. The ESC would be based in
science and have the role to check the quality of the information in the budget. Parliament would
retain the right to allocate funds but lose the option to manipulate information. A draft
constitutional amendment can be found in Colignatus (2005) (DRGTPE). When each democratic
nation has its own ESC then they can exchange information and indirectly contribute to policy
co-ordination. (An additional argument in 2011 is that we would not need an EU supervisory
body on the national budgets.)
II. THE DEBATE IN THE UK
Porter (2010) in the Telegraph of May 18 quotes Mr Osborne’s explanation why he as Odysseus
lets himself be tied to the mast: “Again and again, the temptation to fiddle the figures, to nudge
up a growth forecast here or reduce a borrowing number there, to make the numbers add up has
proved too great, and that is a significant part of the reason for our current problems. (…) I am
the first Chancellor to remove the temptation to fiddle figures by giving up control of the
economic and fiscal forecasts. I recognise that this will create a rod for my back down the line.
(…) That is the whole point. We need to fix the Budget to fit the figures, not fix the figures to fit
the Budget.” The Telegraph also reports the response by the shadow chancellor Alistair Darling:
“The suggestion that Treasury civil servants have colluded in publishing anything other than
accurate figures is just plain wrong. (…) We’re required in law to set out forecasts that take
account of all decisions taken and we’ve published these in Budgets and pre-Budget reports.”
The Chancellor’s ties to the mast are still rather loose. O’Grady (2010) in the Independent of May
18 remarks: “Whatever the intellectual underpinning, the OBR is the same in one respect as any
other creation of government; it can be abolished. What a Chancellor giveth he can take way.”
This is somewhat amended by the advice by Budd et al. (2010) and current legislation. Talbot
(2010) is unconvinced and suggests a position like the US CBO. Yet a constitutional change will
cause that an Economic Supreme Court will be as difficult to abolish as the Judiciary.
The fundamental constitutional challenge is easily overlooked. The economic bodies in the USA,
Germany, France and Holland are all quite content with their role and performance, and
apparently see no reason for change. For myself, it took me years to disentangle the issue. Yet
once it is formulated it should be clear for all to see. The economic advisor has a double role. The
support of policy making is done best by applied science. Science however requires independence
like in the judiciary. Hence, we are speaking about the core of the constitution.
A crucial question for Mr Darling is what happened with warnings on the Credit Crunch.
Apparently those were already filtered out from what reached his desk or possibly even the
Treasury itself. Whistleblowers or censored scientists were not protected by scientifically
independent positions and economic scientists at the academia were focussed not on policy
support but on their papers for the journals. There is currently no place where it all comes
together. In November 2008 Queen Elizabeth II visited the London School of Economics and
asked: why had nobody noticed that the credit crunch was on its way ? Some answers are in the
Royal Economic Society Newsletter, by Belsey et al. (2009) and Dow et al (2009). Those answers
are unsatisfactory and miss out on the constitutional angle.
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The case for the ESC follows from common sense, economic theory itself, logic and some
mathematical analysis – see DRGTPE. To think differently is wishful thinking, hoping for the
magic that it will come together. A hard look shows instead that the economy is too complex to
handle it as we do now, even with this OBR, and, also, that economic science is so advanced that
it can handle that ESC.
The world is annoyed by the disagreements among economists. However, once there is an ESC
with arbitrage at the top of a research body with roots and channels to economic science, then
economic scientists would have a forum to try to settle their differences. There will still be
disagreements but those will contribute less to chaos and help more in clarification. The scientists
who warned about the Credit Crunch and its consequences (like me) would have had a forum and
the ESC would have had the scientific obligation to look into the matter, rather than, as happened
now, that government bureaucracies neglected the messages. A key point is that not just the top of
the ESC must have scientific independence but also the rank and file within the ESC. New ideas
and novel approaches tend to be found by youngsters who still have to make a reputation and a
government bureaucracy that is targetted at performing in set ways is at odds with this freedom of
thought that is crucial for science.
Economic science suffered a severe blow in the public mind because of the Credit Crunch and its
consequences. We have to remain clear-headed on the true cause however. The true cause is the
current structure of government that is insufficiently open to economic science. Don’t blame a
science if it has been made cripple in advance.
Economic theory clarifies that information is a key ingredient for the economic process as well,
and not just prices and quantities. Economic events can no longer be thought of as coming from
some external natural causes. Events are guided by policy advice that derives from economic
theory itself. There are complicated issues of self-fulfilling or self-denying prophecies. Some
degree of control is required on what theory is used, hopefully by economic scientists and not by
the body politic.
There is an earlier discussion by Buchanan & Wagner (1977). They reject current economic
planning and in chapter 6 they use the label of the ESC to denounce the current setup. My
approach however is to improve the flow of information: and then the label of the ESC properly
identifies its optimal function.
The current structure of government and the role of science in government can be understood in
the light of history. In the Middle Ages priests had a Chamber in government but they did not
evolve into scientists and looked mainly after their own interests and eventually they were ousted.
Science evolved and scientists have been called in to help and relations have grown more
formalized. But our democracies got stuck in the middle. Also WW II can be analyzed as a
consequence of economic mismanagement. This update note uses the Credit Crunch as an
example but it actually is only a minor case. The warnings on the Credit Crunch are not the only
points that did not make it to the official planning boards. There are also other crucial economic
findings that somewhere get lost in the big black hole of the current setup of the Trias Politica.
Let me give a clear scientific warning. When our democracies do not adapt their structure with an
ESC then our societies remain hugely at risk because of world population growth and the
ecological conditions for survival, see Tinbergen & Hueting . The warning signs are clear to see
but curiously people do not see the issue as economic and relevant for the budget. Perhaps the
4case for the ESC must be won in the public’s mind with more mundane issues that people see as
economic, such as money.
IV. TAXES AND UNEMPLOYMENT
Let me mention two points that shatter the foundations of the UK coalition government austerity
plans. These are two points that the OBR may not have heard about, just as they may not be
aware yet of the argument for an Economic Supreme Court. The OBR has no good position to
properly function, and the two following examples are intended to show that our democratic
states are better advised to go all the way towards a constitutional change. These two points have
been developed by me at the Dutch Central Planning Bureau but met with censorship by its
Directorate and the full analysis will still come out only when that censorship is lifted.
Consider the proposed raise of VAT to 20%. Standard economic theory advises a shift from
income tax to VAT since high statutory marginal tax rates are supposed to deter enterprise and
effort. Standard theory uses partial derivatives to model the marginal tax rate. However, we
should use total derivatives. The models assume a stagnant Earth while the planet is in motion.
When we consider the situation dynamically then we also have to include the indexation of tax
parameters. For example, let tax exemption be £ 10,000, the marginal rate 50%, and your income
£ 30,000, then your income tax is £ 10,000 or 33.3%. Standard economic analysis focusses on the
50% and policy makers try all kinds of ways to reduce it, such as the shift to VAT. But this is ill
considered. Suppose that national income rises over two years with 10% with real growth and
inflation, and your income as well, so that your income rises to £ 33,000. If exemption stays put
then you indeed pay 50% on the additional £ 3000, so your tax would be £ 1500. However, when
exemption is adjusted with 10% as well towards £ 11,000 then you pay 50% on £ 2000, which is
£ 1000. Your dynamic marginal is your average rate of 33,3%. This is even more important with
rational expectations on this development. This analysis considers averages so that partial
derivatives indeed are relevant for micro cases but the macro-econometric evidence supports the
total derivatives. Hence, the situation is not as bad as the standard models suggest. The case for
switching to VAT is less strong than my fellow economists and advisers to the government say
that it is.
The second example concerns the minimum wage. The 2010 gross minimum wage plus employer
costs in the UK is £ 12,059. The net income after income tax and premiums is £ 9751 (still
including VAT). The difference is given by taxes and premiums at £ 2307 (not including VAT).
See Colignatus (2010) for a table for the UK, the USA and Holland. The difference is generally
called the “tax wedge”. This wedge becomes a different beast at the level of the minimum wage.
There it becomes a “tax void”. Taxes and premiums below the gross minimum cannot be
collected since people are not allowed to work below that minimum. Those taxes and premiums
have only a paper existence in the official statutes but no material existence. Since they are not
collected they can also be abolished at no cost. Thus there is a free or costless measure to create
employment possibilities at the bottom of the labour market.
The two points combine since the VAT causes a larger tax void. Instead of raising VAT to 20% it
should be reduced to 1%. VAT might be abolished but it seems useful to keep it around as a
tactical policy variable.
This information on the dynamic marginal rate and the tax void is available now for twenty years
and is not being used because of lack of respect for science within government bureaucracies, and
to some extent also because of lack of respect within the academia for economic scientists within
the government (or dismissed from it).
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The crisis that erupted in 2007 is in need for explanation by economic theory. As said, Hellwig
(2008ab) and Levitin & Wachter (2010) are clear on the subprime crisis and the subsequent
problems in banking – together called the Credit Crunch. Is that explanation sufficient? My
suggestion is that both onset and consequences should also be in explanation. The fiscal and
monetary authorities and financial regulators provide us with piecemeal engineering on the fly
but there is a lack of overview. The lack of convincing theory and strategy becomes especially
worrying when we see the financial crisis affecting the real economy. People and economic
activities that suffer are not well-represented in national statistics, see Dorling (2010), which
provides analysists with a rosy picture as if the crisis only affects the financial sector and not the
real economy. The time honoured solution is to have the poor and powerless work harder and
earn less to solve the problems of the rich and powerful. But economic theory can do better.
Science requires that we compare various competing economic theories and my suggestion is that
my fellow economists study a particular theory that apparently hasn’t had sufficient attention yet.
The current financial crisis finds a fundamental cause in stagflation. This stagflation originally
was open but was later hidden by (financial) deregulation. Hence there is also a corollary for
policy making: by tackling stagflation the financial crisis would become manageable. A
suggestion on how to tackle stagflation is provided by DRGTPE, along the lines of the above and
the relation to the Phillipscurve and its shifts.
The latter explanation finds some corroboration by the analysis by Raghuram Rajan, see the
interview by Gunn (2010). Rajan sees easier credit for the poor as a policy answer to poverty.
Poverty however is explained by DRGTPE by wrong policies on taxation and unemployment.
VI. A NOTE ON INVESTMENTS AND THE EURO
DRGTPE p156-157 discusses the issue of investments. The current policy in the EU of fiscal
cutbacks destroys welfare and creates unemployment when no proper attention is given to
investments. Let me quote from p157: “The line of thought that I would suggest is that this
optimum requires competing investment banks that develop plans during the economic upswing
that can be implemented during the economic downswing. Who worries about pensions and the
EU Lissabon Strategy is advised to consider this approach. Since the market is an anonymous
beast that may or may not generate such competition, it remains the challenge for governments to
mastermind and manage it all.” A suggestion after the crisis was to also look at consumer
durables as investments with a potentially higher return than the stock market, see Colignatus
(2009a).
Above deeper cause for the credit crunch also is a cause for the current problems with the euro. A
minimum wage that is too high causes unemployment in the internal / sheltered market. Curiously
there is a tendency in some countries to try to resolve this with stimulating the external / exposed
market, see Colignatus (1996). Surplus countries like Germany and Holland then cause problems
for the deficit countries – and then undermine the euro itself. Instead, such surplus countries
should invest in their internal market and reduce wage costs there.
For housing and banking, it may be noted that the funds used for the saving of banks suffering
from bad mortgages might also have been used to resolve those bad mortgages, helping both the
residents and the bank balance sheets. The reason why it does not quite work like that is because
of the leverage by the capital requirement. However, the capital requirement is a beast of its own,
see Hellwig (2010). As the major cause are those bad mortgages, the government would rather
6target those and use its own leverage. For example, in Holland interest on mortgages is tax
deductible. There however is a steep barrier for entrants who must save to generate sufficient
equity for a house, which entrants however cannot deduct their interest. There is a general tax
deduction incentive for savings (called “spaarloon”) but it has an annual ceiling of EUR 613, and
clearly this does not amount to much with regards to buying a house. There is also a curious
argument by left wing parties in Holland for abolishing mortgage interest deduction for the rich,
which seems to overlook that this basically concerns a shift of the burden amongst the rich
themselves with little relevance for the constituencies of those left wing parties. Anyway, rather
than having our economies locked in doldrums due to system errors in the past, governments
might consider to resolve the problems in the housing market in the same generous manner as
with the banks. Of course with a keen eye for fraudulent behaviour where it occurred.
VII. CONCLUSION
The OBR’s setup is likely to put the UK on a path of self-fulfilling forecasts of lower sustainable
growth and higher unemployment than necessary (e.g. in November estimated below 7% only
after 2013). A Parliamentary enquiry is advisable, also concerning the failures by the foreign
economic advisory bodies. This advice extends to the Parliaments of the world. If the Great
Depression, World War II, the Credit Crunch and the environment are insufficient incentives, we
need only wait for the next major crisis, but then there is always the risk that such a crisis wipes
away all scope for rational reconsideration.
Colignatus is the science name of econometrician Thomas Cool (1954). He worked at the Dutch
Central Planning Bureau in 1982-1991. His analysis on unemployment met with censorship by
the CPB Directorate and he was dismissed with an abuse of power. He advises to a boycott of
Holland till this censorship of science is resolved. His website is http://www.dataweb.nl/~cool.
LITERATURE
Belsey, Tim & Peter Hennessy (2009). Why did no one foresee the credit crunch? Royal
Economic Society Newsletter. October 147: 8-10.
http://www.res.org.uk/society/pdfs/newsletter/oct09.pdf
Buchanan, James M. & Richard E. Wagner (1977). Democracy in Deficit: The Political Legacy of
Lord Keynes. Academic Press. http://www.econlib.org/library/Buchanan/buchCv8c6.html
Budd, Alan, Geoffrey Dicks & Graham Parker (2010). Establishing the Office for Budget
Responsibility. Letter to the Chancellor, July 12,
http://budgetresponsibility.independent.gov.uk/d/obr_permanent_body_advice_120710.pdf
Colignatus, Thomas (1994). Trias Politica & Centraal Planbureau. Samuel van Houten
Genootschap.
http://www.dataweb.nl/~cool/Thomas/Nederlands/TPnCPB/Record/1994/11/30/TPenCPB.html
Colignatus, Thomas (1996). Differential impact of the minimum wage on exposed and sheltered
sectors. ewp-get/9608001,
http://www.dataweb.nl/~cool/Papers/ShelteredExposed/AGEshex.html
Colignatus, Thomas (2005). Definition & Reality in the General Theory of Political Economy, 2
nd
edition. Amsterdam: Dutch University Press.
http://www.dataweb.nl/~cool/Papers/Drgtpe/Index.html
Colignatus, Thomas (2009a). Consumer durables as investments that can help us out of the
current economic crisis. http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/13382/
7Colignatus, Thomas (2009b). The current economic crisis: A solution that “lies buried and
obscured in a mass of false theory". http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/3087
Colignatus, Thomas (2010). Don’t tax sweat. Liberal Democrat Voice, April 3,
http://ldv.org.uk/18646
Dorling, Daniel (2010). Injustice. Why social inequality persists. The Policy Press.
http://www.sasi.group.shef.ac.uk/injustice/
Dow, Sheila, et al. (2009). Madam. Royal Economic Society Newsletter. October 147: 10-11
Gun, Dwyer (2010). Predicting the Financial Crisis: A Q&A With Fault Lines Author Raghuram.
The New York Times June 17
Hellwig, Martin F. (2008a). Systemic Risk in the Financial Sector: An Analysis of the Subprime-
Mortgage Financial Crisis. Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on
Collective Goods. Bonn 2008/43,
http://www.coll.mpg.de/sites/www.coll.mpg.de/files/text/2008_43online.pdf
Hellwig, Martin F. (2008b). The causes of the financial crisis. CESifo Forum 4/2008. (See also
the reference to the Jelle Zijlstra lecture.)
http://www.coll.mpg.de/sites/www.coll.mpg.de/files/text/ifo_forum.pdf
Hellwig, Martin F. (2010). Capital Regulation after the Crisis: Business as Usual? MPI Collective
Goods Preprint, No. 2010/31. http://ssrn.com/abstract=1645224
Kuttner, Robert (2010). The Next Banking Crisis. The American Prospect, December,
http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=the_next_banking_crisis
Levitin, Adam J. &  Susan M. Wachter (2010). Explaining the Housing Bubble.
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1669401
O’Grady, Sean (2010). An office to calibrate degrees of uncertainty. The Independent. May 18
Osborne, George (2010). Terms of reference for the interim Office for Budget Responsibility.
London: HM Treasury: http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/data_obr_index.htm
Porter, Andrew (2010). George Osborne sets up watchdog to stop ministers 'fiddling figures'.
Telegraph. May 18
Talbot, Colin (2010). OBR and Mr Osborne: If you have to say you’re a Lady…. Whitehall
Watch blog October 21. http://whitehallwatch.org/2010/10/21/obr-and-mr-osborne-if-you-have-
to-say-you%e2%80%99re-a-lady%e2%80%a6/
Tinbergen, Jan & Roefie Hueting (1991). GNP and Market Prices: Wrong Signals for Sustainable
Economic Success that Mask Environmental Destruction. In: R. Goodland et al. (eds.),
Environmentally Sustainable Economic Development: Building on Brundtland, Ch 4: 51-
57. United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, Paris,
http://www.sni-hueting.info/EN/Publications/1991-Tinbergen-Hueting-GNP-and-market-
prices.pdf
